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FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION-PowER oF CouRT To AumoruZE 
INTER Vxvos DISTRIBUTION FROM INCOMPETENT'S ESTATE-The guardians 
of an eighty-six-year-old incompetent multi-millionaire petitioned for 
authorization to give a portion of the ward's assets to his children and grand-
children. It was not suggested that the proposed beneficiaries were currently 
in need of funds,1 but rather the sole purpose of the inter vivas distribution 
was to minimize the impact of federal estate taxes on the ward's estate at his 
death. It was alleged and proved, however, that the proposed distribution 
would follow a plan which accorded substantially with the terms of the 
ward's will, and which the ward presumably would have followed himself, 
had he remained competent to manage his own affairs.2 On petition to the 
Delaware Chancery Court, held, authorization granted. An incompetent's 
guardian may be authorized to distribute assets of the estate while the ward 
is still alive in order to effect substantial federal estate tax savings, so long 
as it is proved that the ward probably would have done the same thing had 
he remained competent. In re duPont, 194 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1963). 
The substitution of judgment rule provides that a court having juris-
diction of the property of an incompetent may, under certain circumstances, 
permit distributions from his estate to persons who otherwise have no lawful 
claim for support against the incompetent. This rule was first announced 
in Ex parte Whitbread,3 where Lord Eldon authorized payments out of a 
ward's surplus income for the benefit of his brothers and sisters, who were 
found to be in need.4 The ground of decision was not that the brothers and 
sisters had any right to an allowance, but that the court was merely author-
izing what the ward himself probably would have done, if competent.5 
The principle of the Whitbread case has subsequently been recognized 
1 On the contrary, they were presumably provided for quite adequately. Principal 
case at 310. 
2 Under the terms of the ward's will the remainder of his estate, after certain bequests 
to charities, was to be left by testamentary trust for the benefit of his children and grand-
children. After allowing for charitable contributions and expenses the ward's net taxable 
estate would be worth about $135,200,000. The guardians therefore proposed that assets 
valued at about $36,000,000 be given to the ward's children and grandchildren under an 
inter vivos trust which, except for the fact that the distribution would constitute a present 
gift, would conform in all substantial aspects to the terms of the ward's will, and which 
would enable the $36,000,000 to be taxed at the more advantageous gift tax rates. Principal 
case at 310. 
8 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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or adopted in a number of American states.6 However, the American author-
ities which have adopted the rule, like their English counterparts,7 have 
authorized such allowances only upon proof of two conditions. It must be 
shown that the ward probably would have done likewise, if competent, and 
the purpose of the allowance must be to aid relatives who are in need of 
funds for their support.8 Few changes have been made in the traditional 
Whitbread rule, but in some states it has been extended to allow payments 
for support even though the principal of the incompetent's estate will be 
invaded.9 
In some states the Whitbread rule has been rejected, but not because 
of disagreement with the principles which underlie it. Courts rejecting the 
rule have stated that the statutes delimiting their powers preclude its adop-
tion.10 Courts which have adopted the rule, however, have not found the 
authority to do so expressly granted to them by the legislature.11 By liber-
ally construing the statutes which define their authority, these courts have 
found implicit power to distribute the ward's assets to relatives who other-
wise have no legal claim for support against the incompetent.12 The court 
in the principal case took just such an approach.13 
Although consistent with past authority in most respects, the decision in 
6 In re Hudelson's Estate, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941); In re Brice's Guardian-
ship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W .2d 576 (1943); In re Buckley's Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W .2d 
33 (1951); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938); Potter 
v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 Atl. 259 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1895); In re Willoughby, 11 Paige 
257 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); In re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 
265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938). 
7 In re Mackenzie, 43 L.T.R. (n.s.) 681 (Ch. 1880); In re Frost, L.R. 5 Ch. App. 699 
(1870); Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816). 
8 In re Rodgers, 96 N.J. Eq. 6, 125 Atl. 318 (Ch. 1924); Matter of Flagler, 248 N.Y. 
415, 162 N.E. 471 (1928); Monds v. Dugger, 176 Tenn. 550, 144 S.W.2d 761 (1940); see 
cases cited note 6 supra. 
9 See In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W .2d 576 (1943); In re Fleming, 
173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940), 54 HAR.v. L. REv. 143 (1940); In re DeNisson, 
197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938). 
10 Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 137 A.2d 704 (1958); Binney v. Rhode Island Hosp. 
Trust Co., 43 R.I. 222, 110 Atl. 615 (1920); Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 
(1923). Interestingly enough, the Whitbread case was decided at a time when the Lord 
Chancellor's authority over the property of an incompetent was governed by Statute, De 
Praerogativa Regis, 1326, 17 Edw. 2, c. 10, and in Kelly v. Scott, supra, the Maryland court 
construed Statute, De Praerogativa Regis as precluding the application of the Whitbread 
rule.' 
11 See In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); In re Buckley's 
Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 
154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938); Potter v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 Atl. 259 (Ct. Err.&: App. 
1895); Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); In re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 
1024 (1938). 
12 A Michigan court, when confronted with a statute authorizing the court to permit 
payments out of the incompetent's estate for the support of his family, construed the word 
"family" to include "blood relatives, or any group constituting a distinct domestic or 
social body." In re Buckley's Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 112, 47 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1951); MICH. 
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(217) (1962); see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.125 (1956); State ex rel. Kemp 
v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W .2d 143 (1938). 
1a Principal case at 317; see DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 12, § 3705 (Supp. 1962). 
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the principal case, by authorizing partial distribution of the ward's estate 
to relatives who did not need the funds for their support, represents a 
significant extension of the Whitbread rule.14 In a previous case a Pennsyl-
vania court had denied a request for authorization to make distributions 
from the estate of an incompetent for the purpose of minimizing federal 
estate taxes,15 but there the court was limited by a statute which specifically 
stated that such distributions must be for the "care and maintenance" of 
the recipient.16 The court went on to say, however, that in any event tax 
avoidance is not a legally sufficient ground for distributing any part of an 
incompetent's estate while he is alive.17 
In the principal case the court recognized that the need of the recipient 
has been a salient factor in other cases which have applied the Whitbread 
rule.18 Nevertheless, the court held that need on the part of the recipient 
is not a necessary condition where there are other indications of what the 
incompetent would have done.19 Consequently, the need of the recipient, 
the possibilities of tax avoidance, and the size and condition of the ward's 
estate are merely evidentiary matters which are relevant only insofar as 
they aid the court in determining what the incompetent probably would 
have done.20 Having eliminated the requirement of need, it was relatively 
easy for the court to reach the conclusion that the ward would have made 
similar gifts had he possessed the capacity to do so.21 However, the sig-
nificance of the elimination of the requirement oI need is as yet unclear. 
In the principal case the inter vivos distribution did produce a substantial 
benefit to the estate of the ward in that it assured a saving in federal estate 
taxes of at least sixteen million dollars.22 It is therefore not clear whether 
a substantial benefit to the estate will be required in lieu of need on the 
part of the recipients, or whether benefit to the estate is simply another 
factor which the court will look to in determining the incompetent's prob-
able intention.23 I£ a substantial benefit to the estate is not required, it is 
conceivable that a situation might arise in which it could be shown that 
the ward would have done something which would be detrimental to his 
own best interests. Although it is doubtful that any court would extend 
14 See note 8 supra and accompanying text. One leading authority, while recognizing 
the Whitbread rule, stated that even granting allowances for support should be "narrowed 
and discouraged ••• .'' In re Fleming, 173 Misc. 851, 858, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236 (Sup. Ct. 
1940). 
15 Bullock Estate, IO Pa. D. &: C.2d 682 (Orphans' Ct. 1957). 
16 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3644 (Supp. 1962). On the other hand, the applicable 
Delaware statute provides: "A trustee may, in the name of the mentally ill person, do 
whatever is necessary for the care, preservation and increase of his estate." DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 12, § 3705 (Supp. 1962). 
17 Bullock Estate, IO Pa. D. &: C.2d 682, 685 (Orphans' Ct. 1957). 
18 See authorities cited note 8 supra. 
10 Principal case at 315. 
20 Id. at 316-17. 
21 Id, at 312. 
22 See id, at 311. 
2s See id. at 316-17. 
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the operation of the substitution of judgment principle this far, such a result 
would be possible if the sole concern of the court is merely to do what the 
incompetent probably would have done, if he were capable.24 
The court in the principal case could have avoided the uncertainties 
created by its decision had it articulated new limits for the Whitbread rule. 
It is suggested that the better approach would be to allow inter vivos 
distributions out of an incompetent's estate, as in the principal case, only 
when it can be satisfactorily shown that (1) the needs of the ward will still 
be adequately provided for, (2) the ward would probably have done likewise 
if sane, and (3) either (a) the prospective recipients actually need the funds 
for their support, or (b) the distribution will constitute a substantial benefit 
to the ward's estate. This sort of extension of the traditionally limited 
Whitbread rule seems necessary in order to adapt the law to the exigencies 
of modern life. Today, prudent tax planning can play a vital role in pre-
serving an individual's estate for future generations; indeed, in some in-
stances it is absolutely essential. Consequently, it seems both desirable and 
sensible to permit a guardian to protect his ward's estate in the same 
manner that the ward himself would probably protect it, if he were able. 
In addition, if need on the part of the prospective recipients cannot be 
shown, the alternative requirement, that a benefit to the incompetent's 
estate must be demonstrated, would prevent distributions detrimental to 
the ward's estate even though the incompetent would probably have made 
them if competent. 
Robert C. Bonges 
24 Unwarranted extensions of the Whitbread rule are particularly likely if the burden 
of proof requirements are relaxed. See id. at 316. For a discussion of the amount of proof 
required by various courts to establish what the incompetent would have done, if sane, 
see generally, Comment, 17 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 175 (1929); 41 HARv. L. R.Ev. 402 (1928). 
